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Many recent economic studies suggest that child labor both is a result of and a 
strategy to avoid household poverty. If that is the case, then child labor may be viewed 
not so much as a problem but as a solution to poverty's crushing effects. This means that 
banning child labor may, in fact, harm the very people it attempts to help (Basu and Van 
1998). This study explores whether using child labor to avoid poverty can cause it to 
persist through generations of families. If this is indeed the case, policy makers who hope 
to achieve long-term reductions in child labor are faced with the new challenge of 
focusing their attention not only on current child laborers, but future generations as well.  
Though there has been some excellent recent theoretical work examining the 
inter-generational links in child labor and identifying the potential for inter-generational 
child labor traps (Baland and Robinson 2000, Basu 1999, Bell and Gersbach 2000, 
Lopez-Calva and Miyamoto 2000, and Ranjan 1999)
1,  there is a marked absence of 
empirical work on the topic.  
Previous empirical work has focused primarily on isolating the determinants of 
child labor using survey data (Ray 2000a, Ray 2000b, Jensen and Neilsen 1997, Patrinos 
and Psacharopoulos 1997, Psacharopoulos 1997, and Grootaert and Kanbur 1995). This 
study asks if the child labor status of parents impacts the child labor incidence of their 
children, and indicates there is strong evidence that it does. It also asks if there is a direct 
                                                 
1 This also is closely linked to the idea of poverty traps such as that illustrated in Galor and Zeira (1993).   1
link between the child labor status of the parents and their children, and again, there is 
evidence that there is.  
The Inter-Generational Child Labor Link 
This study begins with the assumption that families prefer to withhold their 
children from the labor market until they are adults. However, if a family is struggling to 
survive, they may have to send some or all of their children to work.   
This discussion incorporates the essential aspects of previous theoretical work.
2  
The recent theoretical literature on child labor and poverty traps incorporates a set of core 
assumptions: that parents are altruistic toward their children, there is a trade-off between 
child labor and a child's human capital accumulation, the child's human capital 
accumulation is an increasing function of schooling, and the credit market is imperfect.    
If a family has access to adequate resources, it will choose to invest in the 
education of their children. However, if the parents cannot keep the family above the 
subsistence level, and because they cannot borrow against the future earnings of their 
children, they will choose to send some or all of their children to work to ensure the 
family's survival. This reduction in schooling causes a loss of overall human capital 
accumulation and results in lower wages when the children become adults. In turn, those 
lower wages make those now-adults more likely to send their children to work as child 
laborers. 
This cycle can lead to multiple generations of a family being stuck in what could 
be termed a child labor trap, which is easily illustrated with a simple figure. Considering 
the level of adult human capital as a function of the education received as a child, the idea 
can be expressed as:  () 1 − = t t e f h . Here, ht is the level of adult human capital in time 
                                                 
2 For a more rigorous theoretical treatment, see Emerson and Portela Souza (2000).   2
period t (adulthood) for an individual that reached education level et-1 in time period t-1 
(childhood). If adult wage is an increasing function of human capital ht,  then the level of 
education of the next generation, i.e., the child, et, will be determined by the parent's 
human capital level, or  ) ( t t h g e = . Thus, the child's human capital level as an adult, ht+1, 
will be determined by the parents' human capital level:  ( ) ( ) t t h g f h = +1 .  
The shape of this function can take many forms; one very plausible form is 
illustrated in figure 1. The rationale for such a shape is easily motivated by what is 
termed sheepskin effects, or non-linearities in the returns to education. In other words, the 
wages one can command from the labor market jump up or at least increase 
disproportionately upon reaching a certain level of education, such as literacy, grade 
school certificate, high school diploma, college degree, etc. These types of sheepskin 
effects can cause the human capital accumulation function of children, which is a 
function of their parents' human capital, to have an S-shape.   
Figure 1 assumes the level of human capital an individual is endowed with (that 
is, an adult with no education) is 1, and the maximum human capital attainable is h . This 
figure maps the child's human capital,  1 + t h , as a function of the adult's,  t h . The dynamics 
of this function suggest that there is a critical level of human capital, h*, beyond which a 
family will continue to increase education through the generations until h  is reached. A 
family that is below h* will continue to slide backward, attaining less and less education 
generation by generation, until it reaches the no education/all child labor equilibrium. 
This illustrates the child labor trap.  
It should be noted that while this is a plausible and quite likely scenario, other 
reasons could cause persistence in child labor, although those effects are expected to be 
less important. They include so-called social norms that dictate parents who worked as   3
children simply send their children to work or feel that working imparts important 
qualities in children, or that having parents who were child laborers prevents normal 
returns to education.    
Data and Empirical Strategy 
A. Data 
The data used in this study are taken from the 1996 Brazilian Household Surveys, 
Pesquisa Nacional por Amostragem a Domicilio (PNAD), conducted by the Brazilian 
Census Bureau. The survey encompasses approximately 85,000 households in all of 
Brazil's urban areas and the majority its rural areas, with the exception of the rural areas 
of the Amazon region.  
This study uses a sample of individuals between the ages of 10 and 14 who are 
considered sons, daughters, or other relatives in the family unit.
3  Each observation 
consists of information about the characteristics of the children and their parents and 
families. Due to this criterion, families with single household heads are excluded from 
the analysis.
4  Finally, the study excludes all observations for which the age difference 
between the head of the family or spouse and the oldest child is 14 or less. 
The child labor variables for the children are constructed as follows: children 
were considered working if they worked any hours per week.
5  Children were considered 
to work full time if they worked twenty hours or more per week. The child labor variable 
                                                 
3 PNAD assigns each individual to a position or 'condition' in the family. They are: (1) person of reference; 
(2) spouse; (3) son or daughter; (4) other relative; (5) aggregate; (6) pensionist; (7) domestic worker; and 
(8) relative of the domestic worker. 
4 This selection criterion may impose some selection bias if, for example, children in single-head families 
are more likely to work. However, similar results were obtained when a full sample of 10- to 14-year-old 
children was used. In this case the head of the family's characteristics were used instead of the father and 
mother's characteristics. In order to capture separate impacts of the father's and the mother's child labor 
status and to have a straight interpretation of the coefficients, the results are presented with the sample 
described in the text.  
5 PNAD asks the usual hours worked per week for each individual during the week before the survey.   4
for the parents is defined as follows: parents who said they began working at age 14 years 
or younger were considered child laborers. Each child's school attendance status, gender, 
and region of residence was obtained, as were the parents' years of schooling, age, and 
employment status.
6    
B. Empirical Strategy   
  The study estimates a probit model of the child labor indicator variable on the 
parental child labor status variables and a vector of other controls on the probability that 
the child was a child laborer. The model does not control for the schooling of the parents 
nor the income of the family, in keeping with the hypothesis that the inter-generational 
link is transmitted through adult income, which is a function of schooling.  
Next, the study tests for a direct link to child labor. Controlling for family wealth 
or permanent income, the effect of parental child labor on their children's incidence of 
child labor should disappear if it is true that child labor only results from familial poverty. 
Because it is well established that parental education is the most reliable predictor of a 
family's permanent income, that factor is included as a likely contributor to inter-
generational child labor. If there is still an effect after controlling for parental education, 
it is fairly certain that education is not the entire explanation. The current family income 
is included to strengthen the test; however, it is possible that the family income variable 
is likely endogenous. 
The Inter-Generational Persistence of Child Labor in Brazil 
A. Unconditional Probabilities 
Table 1a presents the proportions of child labor and parents' child labor status in 
1996 for the baseline definitions of child labor for children and parents. In Table 1a, of all 
                                                 
6 All results in this chapter come from the un-weighted sample. All of the empirical tests in this study were   5
10- to 14-year-old children in the sample, 13.9% worked and 70.6% of their fathers and 
37.2% of their mothers were child laborers. More importantly, in families in which 
fathers were child laborers, 17.3% of the children were child laborers. On the other hand, 
in families in which fathers were not child laborers, only 5.9% of the children were child 
laborers. Similarly, in families in which mothers were child laborers, 24.3% of the 
children were child laborers; of those whose mothers were not child laborers, around 
7.8% of the children were child laborers. 
Table 1b presents similar figures when child labor is defined as working at least 
twenty hours a week. In this case, of all children aged 10 to 14, 10.5% were child 
laborers. Again, children from families in which a parent was a child laborer were 
approximately three times more likely to be child laborers, compared to those whose 
parents were not. Although these figures are unconditional probabilities, they suggest the 
existence of inter-generational persistence in child labor in Brazil. 
B. Probit Model Estimations on Child Labor Indicator Variables 
  A standard probit model is estimated to consider the effect of parental child labor 
on the incidence of work among 10- to 14-year-olds. The dependent variable is an 
indicator that equals one if the children usually worked in the labor market. This is 
regressed on indicator variables that equal one if the children's mothers and fathers were 
child laborers. The model also included the ages of the children and parents, the number 
of siblings aged 0 to 5, 6 to 9, 10 to 14 and 15 to 17, and indicators for if the children 
                                                                                                                                                 
replicated using a weighted sample, and obtained qualitatively the same results.   6
were female, lived in an urban area, or had a parent who was not in the labor market.
7  
The results are shown in the first column of table 2.
8 
The study found that parental child labor had a strong and positive effect on the 
probability that children would join the labor force. Female children, those in urban areas, 
and those with one parent not in the labor market were less likely to work, as were those 
who had neither parent in the labor market.
9 However, the greater the number of siblings 
aged 5 to 14, the more likely the children were to work.  
The third specification reported in table 2 shows the results of the regression 
when the parents' years of schooling were added as dependent variables. As expected, the 
parents' years of schooling had a strongly negative effect on the children's probability of 
working; however, the effect of parental child labor remained positive and statistically 
significant. 
The research also estimates a probit model that includes the grandparents' years of 
schooling as explanatory variables. Column 5 of table 2 shows the coefficients from the 
complete set of regressors. The grandparents' years of schooling became insignificant 
when the parents' education variables were included, suggesting there is no direct link 
between grandparents' education and their grandchildren's child labor status. Although 
not reported, the study also estimates a probit including grandparents' years of schooling 
but excluding the parents' years of schooling. In this case, the grandparents' schooling 
                                                 
7 The inclusion of the indicator variables of a parent not in the labor market accounts for the fact that for 
those parents not in the labor market, the age started to work is unknown. 
8A similar model was estimated for the case when child labor was defined as a child who worked at least 
twenty hours in the week of reference. The research obtained qualitatively the same results.  
9 In the sample, roughly 10% of men and 46% of women were not in the labor market. There seems to be 
no reason, a priori, to think that these individuals would be more or less likely to have been child laborers. 
However the child labor history of those not in the labor market was not observed and, in the extreme case 
(they all were child laborers), the negative and significant sign on those not in the labor market variables 
for fathers and mothers could counteract the positive coefficient on the parental child labor variable and 
could mean that the net effect of child labor status is insignificant. Because only 10% of fathers were not in   7
becomes significant; thus, the schooling effect of the grandparents on their grandchildren 
appears to operate through the education of the parents.  
C. Probit Model Estimations Including Family Income 
Adding family income to the probit specification can cause an endogeneity 
problem, but considering it as an explanatory variable is useful in determining whether 
parents' education is an adequate proxy for permanent family income. The family's 
income minus the income from the observed child is included in the regressions in table 
3. The first specification includes both the family income variable as well as the parents' 
education variable; the results are shown in the first column of table 3. In this case, the 
coefficients on both parents' child labor indicator variables are positive and significant 
and the coefficients on the parents' education variables are negative and significant. The 
coefficient on the family income variable is not significant, however. The schooling of 
the parents is not included in the second specification, shown in column 3 of table 3. 
Here, the coefficients on the parents' child labor indicator variables are still positive and 
significant but now the coefficient on the family income variable is negative and 
significant.  
These results are not predicted by the simple model, suggesting the effects of 
parental child labor may be more complex than the simple human capital relationship 
posited in the model and that future research is needed. For example, it is possible that 
human capital accumulation is not only determined by the amount of education, but also 
by social norms, preferences, the quality of education, the level of education of siblings, 
the household environment, etc. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the labor market, it seems very unlikely that this would be the case, but it is potentially a problem for the 
effect of maternal child labor.    8
Figure 2 compares the probability of working in the labor market for a 12-year-
old child of parents who were child laborers and a child of parents who did not work as 
children. It is assumed that both parents work, have the same level of education, are 40 
years old, and have only one child. The probability differences are constructed separately 
for sons and daughters in rural and urban areas and use the coefficients from the first 
column of table 2. At any level of parental education, children from families with parents 
who were child laborers are more likely to be child laborers. This difference decreases as 
the education level of the parents increases, as expected. 
The Effects of Child Labor on Future Earnings 
  Child labor also holds the potential to hamper an adults' ability to generate higher 
earnings. To assess this impact, the study estimates both a simple OLS regression and a 
Heckman selection model for both mothers and fathers. The specifications regress the log 
of current earnings on age and age squared, the age at which the parents started work and 
its square, the grandfathers' years of schooling, the grandmothers' years of schooling and 
a race indicator variable. The individual's years of schooling are added in separate 
specifications. The Heckman estimations attempt to correct for the fact that the study 
only observed the income of those individuals who self-selected to work as adults; the 
results would be biased and suspect if the decision to work as an adult is in any way 
correlated with having been a child laborer. For the selection-bias corrected estimations, 
the number of sons and daughters aged 0 to 9 years old is added in the first stage 
regression; see table 4 for the results. 
  For both fathers and mothers, the coefficient on the age they started working is 
positive and significant in all specifications. In the specification that excludes the years of 
schooling variables, the age started to work coefficients is interpreted as the forgone   9
earnings of an individual entering the labor market one year earlier. Further, child labor 
has a negative impact on current earnings even when the study controls for education and 
other variables. This means there are negative aspects of having been a child laborer over 
and above that of losing out on education, again raising questions about the precise 
effects of parental child labor on children. There do not appear to be positive effects on 
adult earnings of gaining work experience as a child laborer. The squared term is 
negative and significant, which means the marginal negative impact of child labor for 
adults lessens the later the individual enters the labor force. 
  The results of table 4 show that on average, child labor hampers the individual's 
adult earnings. Emerson and Portela Souza (2002), however, examined this aspect of 
child labor more closely and found that in some instances (i.e., for particular occupations) 
child labor may not be harmful. The general idea is that in some professions with strong 
vocational aspects, individuals may be able to do well as adults. However, these results 
suggest that though there may be some areas in which child labor is beneficial, they are 
greatly outweighed by those that are harmful.  
Conclusion and Comment on Policy 
  The results presented in this study suggest that there is a significant relationship 
between a parent's child labor incidence and years of schooling and those of their 
children. Children are more likely to be child laborers if their parents worked as children 
and the less educated their parents are. The educational attainment of grandparents does 
not directly affect the child's labor status, but there seems to be an indirect impact that is 
transmitted through the parents' education. These results hold when controlled for family 
income. In addition, the earlier an individual enters the labor market, the lower his 
earnings are as an adult. Together, these results paint a striking picture of the inter-  10
generational persistence of poverty and the harmful effects of child labor within dynastic 
families.  
This suggests that the simple persistence model does not explain every way in 
which parental child labor affects children and that richer models are needed. If this 
study's results are derived from some unobservable human capital characteristics 
captured by the parental child labor variables (e.g., school quality), then the finding 
essentially captures the inter-generational effects of poverty persistence and is consistent 
with the theoretical discussion of child labor persistence. If, on the other hand, the results 
stem from a difference in the preferences of households in which parents were child 
laborers or different social norms associated with child labor, the current theoretical child 
labor literature is inadequate to fully explain child labor in Brazil.  
These results pose complicated challenges for policy makers. If the persistence 
theory, or a major portion of it, is correct, it may be better to tackle the child labor 
problem on a family-by-family basis: if there are limited resources it may be better to 
target select families to raise each out of the child labor trap. Bell and Gersbach (2000) 
have examined just such a system in their education model. This type of policy is likely 
to be politically unpopular but would have lasting long-term benefits.  
If child labor is indeed primarily a result of familial poverty, banning child labor 
can have quite harmful effects (Basu and Van 1998) and should be treated with the 
utmost of caution and a more challenging policy problem is presented. If, however, 
poverty is a small part of the story and norms or parental preferences are the major 
factors, policy solutions such as absolute bans on child labor may be more effective.    
This study indicates that both are significant factors.  It is easier for policy makers 
to address policy alleviation than parental preferences, but it is possible to marry the two.   11
Policies such as those that target individual families for conditional income transfers that 
create incentives to alter behavior and also incorporate educational programs to 
counteract traditional beliefs that child labor is good for children could affect both 
avenues at the same time. As this study shows, child labor has lasting and harmful effects 
on an individual's earnings ability as an adult and the negative effect of the loss of 
educational attainment is greater than the positive effect of gaining experience as a child 
laborer.
10  Thus, intervention is both necessary and important. 
                                                 
10 For most occupations. See Emerson and Portela Souza (2002).   12
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Table 1a: Unconditional Probabilities 
 
Child Working Strictly Positive Hours, Parent Began Working at Age 14 or Younger. 
Son or Daughter  Is  
Father Was a Child 
Laborer    
Mother Was a Child 
Laborer    
Child Laborer  No  Yes  No Yes  Total 
 Number  7991 16833  16708  8116 24824 
No Row  %  32.19 67.81  67.31  32.69  100 
 Column  %  94.1 82.72  92.19 75.72  86.07 
   Number  501 3517  1416 2602  4018 
Yes Row  %  12.47 87.53  35.24  64.76  100 
 Column  %  5.9 17.28  7.81 24.28  13.93 
   Number  8492 20350  18124 10718  28842 
Total Row  %  29.44 70.56  62.84  37.16  100 








Table 1b: Unconditional Probabilities 
 
Child Working at Least 20 Hours per Week, Parent Began Working at Age 14 or 
Younger. 
Son or Daughter  Is  
Father Was a Child 
Laborer    
Mother Was a Child 
Laborer    
Child Laborer  No  Yes  No Yes  Total 
 Number  8132 17690  16990  8832 25822 
No Row  %  31.49 68.51  65.8  34.2  100 
 Column  %  95.76 86.93  93.74  82.4 89.53 
   Number  360 2660  1134 1886  3020 
Yes Row  %  11.92 88.08  37.55  62.45  100 
 Column  %  4.24 13.07  6.26  17.6 10.47 
   Number  8492 20350  18124 10718  28842 
Total Row  %  29.44 70.56  62.84  37.16  100 
   Column %  100 100  100  100 100   15
 
Table 2: Child Labor Persistence. Probit on Child Labor Indicator Variable  
 Independent Variables   CoefficientStd. ErrorCoefficientStd. Error CoefficientStd. Error
 Child Laborer Father    0.333**  0.029  0.259**  0.030  0.251**  0.039 
 Child Laborer Mother   0.407**  0.027  0.319**  0.028  0.320**  0.036 
 Father's Years of Schooling       -0.028** 0.004  -0.025**  0.005 
 Mother's Years of Schooling       -0.030** 0.004  -0.033**  0.005 
 Age of the Child   0.208**  0.008  0.211**  0.008  0.214**  0.010 
 Years of Schooling of the 
Grandfather (father's side)           0.000  0.009 
 Years of Schooling of the 
Grandmother (father's side)           -0.008  0.009 
 Years of Schooling of the 
Grandfather (mother's side)           -0.001  0.008 
 Years of Schooling of the 
Grandmother (mother's side)           0.002  0.009 
 Female Child   -0.587** 0.032  -0.593** 0.032  -0.587**  0.042 
 Urban   -0.842** 0.023  -0.730** 0.024  -0.736**  0.030 
 Father Not in the Labor 
Market   -0.172** 0.045  -0.236** 0.046  -0.251**  0.062 
 Mother Not in the Labor 
Market   -0.270** 0.027  -0.361** 0.029  -0.361**  0.036 
 Father's Age   0.008**  0.002  0.005**  0.002  0.002  0.002 
 Mother's Age   0.003  0.002  0.000  0.002  0.003  0.003 
 Number of Boys Aged 0 to 5   0.059  0.022  0.033  0.022  0.001  0.029 
 Number of Boys Aged 6 to 9   0.118**  0.020  0.087**  0.020  0.063*  0.027 
 Number of Boys Aged 10 to 
14    0.085**  0.018  0.059**  0.018  0.040  0.022 
 Number of Boys Aged 15 to 
17    0.036  0.020  0.012  0.020  0.038  0.026 
 Number of Girls Aged 0 to 5   0.126**  0.021  0.096**  0.021  0.128**  0.027 
 Number of Girls Aged 6 to 9   0.122**  0.020  0.092**  0.020  0.109**  0.025 
 Number of Girls Aged 10 to 
14    0.078**  0.018  0.049**  0.018  0.028  0.023 
 Number of Girls Aged 15 to 
17    -0.022  0.023  -0.040  0.023  -0.043  0.029 
 Constant   -3.871** 0.119  -3.255** 0.124  -3.245**  0.159 
 Number of Observations   28805    28665 
        
 Chi-Squared (n)   4018.73(17)    4094.19(19) 
        
 Psuedo R-Squared   0.230    0.1924 
* Statistically significant at the 5% level. ** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
White's heteroskedastic consistent errors used in all regressions.   16
 
  Table 3: Child Labor Persistence.  
Probit on Child Labor Indicator Variable  
Including Family Income as Explanatory Variable  
 Independent Variables   Coefficient Std. ErrorCoefficient Std. Error 
 Child Laborer Father    0.258**  0.031  0.310**  0.030 
 Child Laborer Mother   0.319**  0.028  0.369**  0.028 
 Father's Years of Schooling   -0.026** 0.004 
 Mother's Years of Schooling   -0.028** 0.004 
 Age of the Child   0.212**  0.008  0.211**  0.008 
 Female Child   -0.583** 0.033  -0.578** 0.033 
 Urban   -0.718** 0.024  -0.783** 0.024 
 Father Not in the Labor Market   -0.244** 0.046  -0.230** 0.046 
 Mother Not in the Labor Market  -0.363** 0.029  -0.314** 0.028 
 Father's Age   0.005**  0.002  0.008**  0.002 
 Mother's Age   0.001  0.002  0.003  0.002 
 Number of Boys Aged 0 to 5   0.037  0.022  0.052*  0.022 
 Number of Boys Aged 6 to 9    0.081**  0.021  0.101**  0.021 
 Number of Boys Aged 10 to 14   0.058**  0.018  0.073**  0.018 
 Number of Boys Aged 15 to 17   0.011  0.021  0.032  0.021 
 Number of Girls Aged 0 to 5   0.095**  0.022  0.115**  0.022 
 Number of Girls Aged 6 to 9    0.095**  0.020  0.113**  0.020 
 Number of Girls Aged 10 to 14   0.047**  0.018  0.065**  0.018 
 Number of Girls Aged 15 to 17   -0.030  0.024  -0.015  0.023 
 Family Income Minus Child 
Income   -0.00002 0.00002 
-
0.00012** 0.00002 
 Constant   -3.311** 0.126  -3.797** 0.121 
 Number of Observations   27791  27926 
      
 Chi-Squared (n)   3935.88(20)  3837.11(18) 
      
 Psuedo R-Squared   0.2384  0.2308 
* Statistically significant at the 5% level. ** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
White's heteroskedastic consistent errors used in all regressions. 
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Table 4: Effect of Child Labor on Log of Adult Earnings of Fathers and Mothers.  
OLS and Heckman Model Estimates.  
 Father 
   OLS   Heckman 









Age Started Work  0.06132**  0.00869  0.05130** 0.00766   0.06018** 0.00874  0.05101** 0.00768
Age Started Work-
Squared -0.00070**  0.00031  -0.00156** 0.00028   -0.00066** 0.00032  -0.00155** 0.00028
Years of Schooling      0.11969** 0.00166       0.11944** 0.00173
Father's Years of 
Schooling 0.07389**  0.00317  0.01954** 0.00290   0.07329**  0.00320  0.01949** 0.00290
Mother's Years of 
Schooling  0.07557** 0.00351  0.02178** 0.00318   0.07557** 0.00352  0.02189** 0.00319
Age 0.07983**  0.00601  0.05777** 0.00530   0.07634**  0.00621  0.05694** 0.00553
Age-Squared -0.00094**  0.00006  -0.00064** 0.00006  -0.00090** 0.00007  -0.00063** 0.00006
Non-White -0.44442**  0.01352  -0.27841** 0.01214   -0.44054** 0.01367  -0.27771** 0.01221
Constant 3.52783**  0.15250  3.65264** 0.13444   3.62497**  0.15853  3.67701** 0.14208
Number of Observations  17950     17925        19571     19543    
R-Squared 0.3133    0.468             
Lambda           -0.182 0.075  -0.047  0.088 
Chi-Squared (n)           7342.63(7) 13041.52 (8) 
 
 Mother 
Age Started Work  0.09744**  0.00590  0.03040** 0.00548   0.07096** 0.00651  0.01697** 0.00590
Age Started Work-
Squared -0.00208**  0.00014  -0.00073** 0.00013   -0.00163** 0.00016  -0.00053** 0.00014
Years of Schooling      0.10580** 0.00224       0.08790** 0.00281
Father's Years of 
Schooling  0.07091** 0.00394  0.03240** 0.00362  0.06404** 0.00422  0.03293** 0.00386
Mother's Years of 
Schooling  0.06762** 0.00424  0.01961** 0.00394   0.05807** 0.00457  0.01913** 0.00420
Age 0.14297**  0.01366  0.06467** 0.01239   0.10366** 0.01434  0.03954** 0.01290
Age-Squared -0.00165**  0.00017  -0.00070** 0.00015  -0.00114** 0.00017  -0.00037** 0.00016
Non-White -0.38613**  0.01926  -0.27747** 0.01745   -0.37555** 0.02026  -0.28780** 0.01837
Constant 1.25984**  0.27920  2.92562** 0.25350     2.57553**  0.30262  3.89807  0.27312
Number of Observations  8943    8893      13151    13093   
R-Squared 0.3047    0.4444             
Lambda           -0.547 0.038  -0.496  0.041 
Chi-Squared (n)                 2019.71(7)  2818.71(8)  
* Statistically significant at the 5% level. ** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
White's heteroskedastic consistent errors used in all regressions.  18
 
 
Appendix Table: Unweighted Means 
Children's Variables  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Age 28847  12.011  1.421  10  14 
Female Indicator Variable  28847  0.492  0.500  0  1 
Hours 28842  3.763  10.796  0  98 
Working Strictly Positive Hours Indicator Variable  28842  0.139  0.346  0  1 
Working at Least 20 Hours Per Week Indicator Variable 28842  0.105  0.306  0  1 
Urban Indicator Variable  28847  0.774  0.418  0  1 
Schooling Indicator Variable  28841  0.925  0.263  0  1 
Only School Indicator Variable  28,841  0.822  0.383  0  1 
School and Work Indicator Variable  28,836  0.102  0.303  0  1 
Only Work Indicator Variable  28,842  0.024  0.153  0  1 
No School, No Work Indicator Variable  28,836  0.050  0.218  0  1 
Years of Schooling  28830  3.341  1.946  0  9 
Age Started Work  4542  10.055  1.997  4  14 
 Fathers' Variables        
Age 28847  43.824  9.225  25  98 
Years of Schooling  28801  4.920  4.559  0  17 
Age Started Work  27125  12.134  3.688  4  40 
Earnings 28300  521.001  905.135  0  40000 
Child Labor (Age 14 or Below)  28847  0.706  0.456  0  1 
Child Labor (Age 10 or Below)  28847  0.394  0.489  0  1 
Not in Labor Market  28814  0.100  0.300  0  1 
Mothers' Variables       
Age 28847  39.602  7.748  25  91 
Years of Schooling  28744  5.035  4.375  0  17 
Age Started Work  17075  13.900  5.784  4  56 
Earnings 28710  143.869  445.588  0  20000 
Child Labor (Age 14 or Below)  28847  0.372  0.483  0  1 
Child Labor (Age 10 or Below)  28847  0.203  0.402  0  1 
Not in Labor Market  28831  0.462  0.499  0  1 
Grandparents' Variables:       
 Years of Schooling of the Grandfather (father's side)   22085  2.016  2.949514  0  17 
 Years of Schooling of the Grandmother (father's side)   23813  1.707  2.649685  0  17 
 Years of Schooling of the Grandfather (mother's side)   23470  2.075  2.879995  0  17 
 Years of Schooling of the Grandmother (mother's side)  25059  1.744  2.618133  0  17 
 Families' Variables:        
Family Income Minus Child Income  27953  838.897  1299.069  0  63500 
 Number of Boys Aged 0 to 5   28847  0.195  0.471  0  5 
 Number of Boys Aged 6 to 9    28847  0.267  0.514  0  4 
 Number of Boys Aged 10 to 14    28847  0.863  0.771  0  4 
 Number of Boys Aged 15 to 17    28847  0.252  0.495  0  3 
 Number of Girls Aged 0 to 5   28847  0.191  0.469  0  5 
 Number of Girls Aged 6 to 9    28847  0.266  0.515  0  3 
 Number of Girls Aged 10 to 14    28847  0.835  0.763  0  5 
 Number of Girls Aged 15 to 17    28847  0.209  0.455  0  4 
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Figure 2:  Differences in a 12-Year-Old Child's Work 
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